

Message Text

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ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 NEA-11 ISO-00 MCE-00 OMB-01 TRSE-00
AID-05 ACDA-12 EB-08 CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00
INRE-00 L-03 H-01 SS-15 SSO-00 HA-05 NSCE-00
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O 281124Z JUN 78
FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9134
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BONN
USMISSION NATO
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE
CNO WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 TEHRAN 6201

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: MASS, IR, NL
SUBJ: DUTCH FRIGATES FOR IRAN

REF: THE HAGUE 3506, DTG 271035Z JUN 78

1. IN LIGHT OF REFTEL, PARAS BELOW WILL DESCRIBE SUBJECT
SITUATION AS IT HAS EVOLVED HERE. WE RECOGNIZE, OF COURSE,
THAT ANSWER TO THE HAGUE'S REQUEST CONTAINED REFTEL WILL BE
PROVIDED BY WASHINGTON.

2. VISIT OF USN EXPERT TEAM JUNE 24-25 TO TEHRAN WAS AT
REQUEST OF GOVERNMENT OF IRAN, MADE BY GEN. TOUFANIAN DURING
HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH DOD IN WASHINGTON JUNE 9. TWO-DAY VISIT
WITH CHARGE AND POL/MIL COUNS, AND
INVOLVED DISCUSSIONS AMONG GEN. TOUFANIAN, ADM. HABIBOLLAHI,
IIN STAFF AND ARMISH MAAG REPRESENTATIVES. ADDITIONALLY,
THERE WERE STAFF-LEVEL DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN IIN AND USN
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IN WHICH DUTCH REPRESENTATIVES PARTICIPATED. THESE
VARIOUS DISCUSSIONS HIGHLIGHTED TWO AREAS REQUIRING
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION. FIRST, USN EXPERTS, WHILE
BELIEVING DUTCH SHIPBUILDERS ARE TECHNICALLY COMPETENT
TO INTEGRATE US WEAPONS SYSTEMS WITH DUTCH-PROPOSED
COMBAT DIRECTION, SENSORS AND FIRE CONTROL SYSTEMS, ARE
CONCERNED THAT DUTCH MAY NOT AS YET HAVE DEVELOPED THEIR

PLANS TO DEGREE SUFFICIENT TO PROVIDE ASSURANCES THAT WHEN INTEGRATION OCCURS PERFORMANCE NORMALLY ASSOCIATED WITH STANDARD MISSILE SYSTEM WOULD BE ACHIEVED.

3. COMMENT: WE NOTE IN PASSING THAT IN ALL MEETINGS, NEITHER USN EXPERTS NOR ARMISH/MAAG CHIEF NAVY SECTION (RADM. COLLINS) CAST DOUBT ON DUTCH TECHNICAL COMPETENCE TO DO THE JOB. THIS POINT WAS ALWAYS UNDERSCORED. AT SAME TIME, QUESTION WAS RAISED WHETHER PROBLEMS INVOLVED COULD BE SOLVED SUCCESSFULLY WITHIN TIME AND MONEY LIMITS IRANIANS ARE SPECIFYING. USN EXPERTS DO NOT AS YET FEEL COMFORTABLE ABOUT ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THIS. IIN PEOPLE KEEP TELLING US THAT DUTCH STATE CATEGORICALLY IT CAN BE DONE. TO FEEL COMFORTABLE ABOUT SUCH ASSERTIONS OUR EXPERTS WANT TO HAVE TECHNICAL BASIS WHICH SUPPORTS THAT ACCOMPLISHMENT.
END COMMENT.

4. SECOND AREA REQUIRING MORE INFORMATION IS NEED TO FLESH OUT IIN SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS (SOR) AND TO ASSESS DUTCH FRIGATES ABILITY TO FULFILL THOSE SOR. COMMENT: OUR EXPERTS DO NOT SUGGEST THAT DUTCH PROPOSAL WILL NEED TO BE MODIFIED IN LIGHT OF ASSESSMENT OF IIN SOR; THAT QUESTION CANNOT BE ANSWERED UNTIL THIS ASSESSMENT TAKES PLACE. IIN SOR IS BEING DEVELOPED EXPEDITIOUSLY
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SO THAT SUCH ASSESSMENT CAN OCCUR. END COMMENT.

5. BECAUSE OF THESE TWO AREAS REQUIRING CLARIFICATION, WE SUGGESTED EARLIEST FEASIBLE TECHNICAL EXPERT DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON. THIS WAS SUPPORTED BY IIN AND SHAH HAS APPROVED. CINC IIN HAS REQUESTED A 30-DAY EFFORT (WITH AT LEAST PRELIMINARY FINDINGS) BY DUTCH, IIN AND USN EXPERTS. COMMENT: USN EXPERTS INDICATED HERE THAT IF TECHNICAL STUDY WERE GIVEN DIRECTION, FUNDS AND PRIORITY FROM CNO, PLUS TIMELY AND FULL COOPERATION OF DUTCH, IT POSSIBLE THAT SUCH EFFORT COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHIN THE DESIRED VERY SHORT PERIOD. END COMMENT.

6. WITH RESPECT TO VERY STRONG PRESSURES BEING APPLIED BY DUTCH ON IRANIANS TO GET FRIGATE DEAL UNDER CONTRACT, WE WOULD SUGGEST THIS BE RELIEVED BY DEPARTMENT'S OFFICIALLY INFORMING DUTCH AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON THAT EARLIER US DECISION NOT TO CONSIDER BUILDING FRIGATES SOUGHT BY IRAN STILL PERTAINS; UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WILL US BUILD IRANIAN FRIGATES.

7. FYI: JUNE 26 ARMISH/MAAG CHIEF NAVY ADVISOR HAD

DISCUSSION WITH CDR. VAN RAAZ, A ROYAL NETHERLAND NAVY
DESIGN ENGINEER, AND MR. BOSMA, A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 TEHRAN 6201

DUTCH SHIPYARDS, TO CLARIFY SEVERAL IMPRESSIONS SUGGESTED
BY COMMENTS OF THE TWO DUTCHMEN. RADM. COLLINS STRESSED
TWO POINTS: A) HE AND HIS NAVY SECTION COLLEAGUES, ON
FRIGATE WEAPONS SUTIES UQUESTIONS AS ON ALL QUESTIONS,
WERE ACTING AN COMMENTING AS ADVISORS-AND SOLELY AS
ADVISORS-TO THE IIN AT THE REQUEST OF THE GOI; AND B)
THE US HAD NO INTENTION OF UNDERCUTTING THE DUTCH, OR
ANYONE ELSE, WITH RESPECT TO FRIGATE CONSTRUCTION, AGAIN
AS ON ANY AND ALL QUESTIONS. VAN RAAZ AND BOSMA SAID THAT ON
FRIGATE CONSTRUCTION THEY UNDERSTOOD COMPLETELY AND WERE
NOT CONCERNED ABOUT US COMPETITION SINCE THE SHAH HAD
ESSENTIALLY PROMISED THE MAJOR PORTION OF FRIGATE CONSTRUC-
TIONBUSINESS TO THE DUTCH.

8. COLLINS WENT ON TO STATE THAT IF THE USG IS TO BE
INVOLVED WITH THE FRIGATES FOR IRAN, WE MUST KNOW PRECISELY
WHAT IS EXPECTED IN TERMS OF US PARTICIPATION, AND WILL
WANT TO FEEL ASSURED BEFORE OBLIATIONS ARE UNDERTAKEN
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THAT WE WILL BE ABLE TO PERFORM TO MEET SUCH EXPECTATIONS. CLEARLY, IT IS IN NO ONE'S INTEREST TO HAVE AN OUTCOME INVOLVING UNMET EXPECTATIONS BECAUSE OF INCLARITY AND INCOMPLETE UNDERSTANDING AT THE OUTSET. COMMENT: COLLINS' COMMENTS IN MEETING WITH GEN. TOUFANIAN AND ADM. HABIBOLLAHI ALSO STRESSED-SEVERAL TIMES-NAVY SECTION ADVISOR'S ROLE AND NEED FOR CLARITY FROM OUTSET SO THAT EVERYONE'S EXPECTATIONS WILL BE MET. END COMMENT. END FYI.

9. FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL COMMENTS MAY ALSO BE HELPFUL:
A) QUESTION OF HARPOON AND TIMING, AS WELL AS POSSIBILITY OF DUTCH ELECTRONICS JEOPARDIZING AVAILABILITY OF HARPOON NOT RPT NOT DISCUSSED AS SUGGESTED PARA 3 REFTEL. (B) OUR UNDERSTANDING, INCLUDING COMMENTS HERE BY USN EXPERTS, IS THAT USN HAS NOT AGREED , AT LEAST AS YET, THAT "DUTCH PLAN VIABLE AND COULD BE COMPLETED WITHIN THE SPECIFIED TIME FRAM", AS WAS SUGGESTED IN PARA 1 OF THE HAGUE 3471 AND PARA 5 OF REFTEL, WE CANNOT, OF COURSE, MAKE DEFINITIVE STATEMENTS ON THIS POINT; WE LEAVE THAT TO USN EXPERTS AND WASHINGTON OFFICIALS WHO HAVE TALKED TO THE DUTCH, BUT OUR FIRM UNDERSTANDING IS THAT USN EXPERTS DO NOT FEEL THAT ADEQUATE TECHNICAL DATA YET IN HAND ON WHICH TO BASE JUDGEMENTS AND REACH CONCLUSIONS ON DUTCH PLANS FOR FRIGATES INVOLVING US WEAPONS SUITES.
C) WE UNDERSTAND THAT DUTCH SHIPYARDS HAVE PROGRAMMED AN AUG. 1 SLOT TO BEGIN AN IRANIAN FRIGATE. IN ORDER TO DO THIS, CONSTRUCTION OF A DUTCH VESSEL WAS RESCHEDULED. WE ASSUME THIS IS AT HEART OF DUTCH PRESSURE ON GOI TO UNDERTAKE CONTRACTUAL COMMITMENT AT EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME. INTENSE DUTCH PRESSURE PROBABLY ALSO RELATED TO FACT THAT FRG SCHEDULED TO MAKE DETAILED PRESENTATION TO IRANIANS ON FRIGATES JULY 15.

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10. FINALLY, WE WISH TO CONCLUDE BY UNDERSCORING CENTRAL POINT RELATED TO VISIT OF USN EXPERTS IN VIEW OF CONTENT VAN EEKELEN DISCUSSION WITH CHARGE BROWN IN THE HAGUE REPORTED REFTEL. CARMISH/MAAAG MET WITH USN EXPERTS UPON THEIR ARRIVAL IN TEHRAN AND MADE CLEAR IN STRONGEST TERMS THAT NO MEMBER OF THE GROUP WAS TO DO ANYTHING- THOUGHT ACTION OR WORD- THAT WOULD EVEN REMOTELY SUGGEST THAT US WOULD AGREE TO CONSTRUCT IRANIAN FRIGATES. TO DO SO WOULD EXCEED THEIR INSTRUCTIONS AS HE HAD BEEN ADVISED OF THEM, AND WOULD EXCEED HIS INSTRUCTIONS ; ANY INFRACTIONS WOULD BE REPORTED. MISSION CAN CONFIRM THAT THESE INSTRUCTIONS WERE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD AND SCRUPULOUSLY

ADHERED TO. WE UNDERSTAND THAT SIMILARLY RESTRICTIVE AND
FORCEFUL GUIDANCE WAS PROVIDED USN EXPERTS IN WASHINGTON
PRIOR TO THEIR TRIP.
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